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FISH OUT OF WATER: SETTING A SINGLE
STANDARD FOR ALLOCATION OF TREATY
RESOURCES
Eric Eisenstadt*
I. Introduction
In its sorry history of relations with American Indians, the United
States has adopted a variety of approaches in an ongoing attempt to
control Indians and their affairs. One such approach, loosely referred
to as the treaty era, was marked by formally signed treaties between
the Indian tribes and the federal government. This era ended in 1871
when the Congress declared that no tribe would thereafter be recog-
nized as capable of making treaties with the United States, although
existing treaties would be honored.'
Although no longer made, many treaties are still in force, requiring
judicial interpretation and enforcement. One particularly intractable
problem has been the allocation of natural resources under treaties.
Treaties often create a right in the Indian tribe to utilize a resource,
a right which may conflict with rights of non-Indians. The treaty may
be explicit in granting such a right, such as the right to hunt and fish
on off-reservation land. In other cases the treaty is silent, but a judicial
doctrine has created a right in a resource, typified by the Winters
reserved water rights doctrine.2 Whatever its source, the Indian right
to utilize a resource granted in a treaty may not be absolute, since
that resource must be managed or shared with non-Indians.3 This
conflict between Indians and non-Indians over resources requires court
intervention in order to interpret the treaty and allocate the resource
between the parties.
This comment will contrast the two differing standards that have
been adopted by the Supreme Court in allocating resources to Indian
tribes. The first standard, promulgated in Arizona v. California,4
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1. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
2. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
3. For example, it has been held that the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 95-632, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.)
preempts treaty hunting rights. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986).
4. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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provided Indian tribes with water rights equal to "practical irrigable
acreage" (PIA), that is, sufficient water to irrigate each acre of the
reservation that was irrigable, regardless of whether such land was
actually under cultivation.- The second standard came from a fishing
rights case, Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n.6 This standard set a 50% ceiling on the Indian
catch of fish caught in special common areas; the Indians catching the
fish in the special common areas can earn no more than a "moderate
income" from fishing? This comment first examines the differing
standards for allocation of resources. The comment then compares
and contrasts the standard that applies to fishing rights with the
standard used for water rights and criticizes the moderate income
standard advanced in Washington. The comment then concludes with
a proposal for a unified standard that should apply to all treaty
resource allocations.
II. The Two Standards of Treaty "Resource Allocation
A. Water Rights - The PIA Standard
Many, if not all, Indian treaties were silent regarding the Indians'
right to water flowing through their reservations. Beginning with Win-
ters v. United States8 and culminating in Arizona v. California,9 the
Supreme Court created an implied water rights doctrine applying to
Indian reservations. 0 In Winters the Supreme Court addressed the
competing rights of Indians to take water from the Milk River in
Montana, which flowed through the reservation, and the rights of
non-Indian upstream users. The government sued upstream non-Indi-
ans to prevent their diversion of the river for large-scale irrigation
projects. These diversions prevented the Indians from irrigating pasture
land on the reservation. The non-Indians defended their actions by
5. Id. at 600.
6. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
7. Id. at 686-87 & n.27.
8. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
9. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
10. Winters, 207 U.S. at 564; Arizona, 373 U.S. at 546. Although for half a century
the Winters doctrine applied only to Indian treaty claims, the doctrine has been expanded
to include reserved water rights on all federal lands. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (holding that national park has reserved water right
that is superior to later appropriators of water; the park may take as much water from
upstream users as needed to fulfill its purpose); Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601 (holding that
reserved water rights are "equally applicable to other federal establishments such as
National Recreation areas and National Forests.").
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showing that their diversion of the waters was prior in time to the
Indians' use. Montana and most western states followed the prior
appropriation water doctrine," which holds that the party who first
puts waters to beneficial use has the right to continue to divert that
amount of water.' 2 Thus, under Montana law, the non-Indian users
had a valid claim to continue to divert the waters.
The treaties which created the reservation were silent on the question
of water rights. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that Indians had an
implied right to take water. 3 The Court reached this conclusion by
examining congressional intent in providing water for reservations.
Because one of the chief purposes of settling the Indians on reservations
was to "civilize" them through agrarian living, the Court found that
the federal government must have reserved water for the Indians for
that use.' 4 Since the creation of the reservation predated the non-
Indian diversion, the Indians' claim to water was held to be superior
to the non-Indian's claim.
Although Winters created the doctrine of an implied water right,
the question of how to quantify the Indian water allocation remained
unanswered for many years. Finally, in Arizona, the Supreme Court
heard a massive dispute between several states over rights to the waters
of the Colorado River and its tributaries. As part of a comprehensive
settlement of entitlement to the waters, the Court also examined the
Indians' claims to water from the river system. Applying the Winters
doctrine, the Court found that the Indians were entitled to water.' 5
Additionally, the Court determined the quantity, of water by adopting
the PIA standard.' 6 The Supreme Court appointed a Special Master
to make recommendations, and subsequently adopted his finding that
the Indians should receive water computed under the PIA standard.1 7
11. Two basic systems exist controlling water rights. The eastern states follow the
common law riparian rights doctrine. The arid western states use the prior appropriation
system. A. DAN TAInocK, LAW OF VATER RIGHTS AND RIsouRcas § 1 (1988).
12. The holder of water rights by prior appropriation may loose these rights either
by non-use, abandonment, or forfeiture. Id. § 518.
13. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
14. Id.
15. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 595.
16. Arizona proposed that the water allocation should be equal to satisfy the
immediate requirements of the Indians at any particular time. Special Master's Report,
Arizona v. California 255 (1965) [hereinafter Special Master's Report]. This standard is
roughly analogous to the moderate income standard of Washington. It would permit
the Indians to use water, but only as much as they needed to subsist. Similar to
Washington, the treaty right is held in gross for the individual Indians, not the tribe,
and is subject to revision as the Indian needs change. The criticism of such a scheme
is that preventing any growth in agriculture would tend to freeze the Indian reservations
in a permanent state of economic underdevelopment.
17. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600.
No. 1]
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Since the Court did not advance its own independent rationale, the
Special Master's Report provides the clearest explication of the rea-
soning supporting the PIA.
The Special Master found that, consistent with Winters, it was first
necessary to consider the intent underlying the creation of the reser-
vation in order to determine the rights of the Indians." The Special
Master noted that the creation of the reservation did not entail an
assumption that the Indians would eventually wither away and disap-
pear; on the contrary, once "civilized" by agrarian living, the Indians
would thrive. 19 The reservations were viewed as the future home for
generations of Indians. The Special Master decided that water must
be reserved for future uses by the Indians, and implicit in these future
uses was expansion. 20 The Court's holding in Arizona provided the
Indians with a generous amount of water, which greatly distressed
state authorities in the water scarce west.21 Yet despite legal challenge,2
and modifications making the doctrine less beneficial for Indians,2 the
18. Special Master's Report, supra note 16, at 259.
19. Id. at 260.
20. Id. at 260-61. The Special Master also noted the possibility that other tribes
might be relocated to join the original tribe on its reservation land. Id. The right to
take water is not, however, unrestricted. In addition to the PIA standard, which limits
the amount of water that an Indian tribe may divert, the Supreme Court has held that
the federal lands are entitled to only enough water to fulfill the intent of the federal
reservation. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 719 (1978). When no clear
intent to reserve water can be shown, the Court has been unwilling to find a reserved
water right for the federal land. Id. at 700.
21. INDIAN RESOuRCEs INsTrruTE, TRmAL WATER MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 4-14
(1988) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
22. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (per curiam) (mem.) judgment below
affirmed without opinion by an equally divided Court). The Court granted certiorari to
consider if the PIA standard should remain the correct standard for Indian water rights
cases. The lengthy and expensive litigation undertaken by the state of Wyoming ended
in failure when the Court affirmed the lower court and left the PIA standard intact.
This result will probably discourage other challenges and accelerate the trend toward
state-tribal settlements. See Reid P. Chambers, Indian Water Rights After the Wyoming
Decision (1989) (symposium paper), in 1989 HARvARD INDLAN LAW SYMPosIUM 153
(Harvard Law School Publications Center 1990).
211. Although the PIA standard has survived direct challenge, several Supreme Court
opinions have weakened some of the advantageous aspects of the standard. In United
States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 520, 525-26 (1971), the Court held that the McCarran
Amendment applies to Indian reserved water cases. The McCarran Amendment, 43
U.S.C. § 666(a) (1988), waives federal sovereign immunity against state attempts to
bring the federal government into state court adjudications of water rights, thus allowing
state courts to decide general stream adjudications. Hence, while the PIA standard will
still be used, it will be a state court that will quantify that amount by determining
congressional intent, the minimal needs of the reservation, and other questions, HAND-
BOOK, supra note 21, at 2-21. The right to try Indian water rights cases in state courts
was specifically upheld in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1983). Indian access to federal courts was further curtailed when the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/9
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PIA standard remains the sole method of determining water allocation.
Although complex and rife with problems, 24 the actual computation
of the quantity of water under the PIA standard has several positive
features from an Indian perspective. The PIA standard depends on
the size of the land, not the number of people.2s The resource is held
by the tribe for the tribe's use, not held in gross by individuals. As
the original signatories of the treaty no doubt viewed the water as a
collective tribal resource, the PIA standard is consistent with such an
outlook.2 6 Significantly, the PIA standard, as contrasted with the
"moderate income" standard, does not set an economic level that the
Indians cannot exceed. Should the .PIA standard provide the tribe with
Court held that federal concurrent jurisdiction should normally be dismissed in favor
of state court proceedings. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 570
(1983). The negative impact of these decisions on Indian water rights flows from the
assumption that state courts tend to be more hostile to Indian water rights claims.
Indian claims under the PIA standard were further weakened when the Supreme
Court applied the doctrine of finality strictly to Water rights claims. Thus, when a tribe
attempted to have a new determination made of the PIA allocation, claiming that the
federal government had omitted irrigable lands in the first determination, the Court
rejected any attempt to reopen the issue of the allocation stressing the strong interests
in finality. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 606 (1983). Despite the fact that the
tribe had not been a party to the original determination and claimed inadequate
representation, the Court rejected the Tribe's claim. This decision was reaffirmed in
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), when a Tribe which was not a party to
the original determination showed in fact there were over 20,000 irrigable acres on the
reservation, not 5,875 as the original determination found. Despite the Tribe's claim of
a conflict of interest because the federal government was both litigating for the Tribe
and acting as administrator of non-Indian water reclamation projects, which stood to
lose water to the Indians, the Court allowed the original determination to stand. Id. at
135 & n.15.
24. The chief problem with-the PIA is that the very phrase "practical irrigable
acreage" is not self-defining. What is meant by practical? Does this mean simply that
the costs of irrigating the land is less than the expected yield of crops? What role should
interest rates, farm prices, and government subsidies have in determining if it is
"practical" to irrigate? What if advances in irrigation require less water to irrigate the
same acreage? Can the Indians use the PIA allotment for non-agricultural uses? Can
the PIA allotment be traded and sold? See generally PaER W. SLY, RESERVED WATER
RIorrs SEMTLMIENT MA.uA_ (1988); David S. Brookshire et al., Economics and the
Determination of Indian Reserved Water Rights, 23 NAT. REsoUncEs J. 749 (1983);
Carol S. Leach, Federal Reserved Rights, in Water: The Problem of Quantification, 9
TEX. TEcH L. Rnv. 89 (1977).
25. Allocation based on land could conceivably be detrimental to Indians if a
reservation was severely overpopulated. However, the reality is that reservations tend
to have very low population densities. On federal reservations, the population density
is less than one person per acre. See CARL WAt & MOLLY BRAtm, ATLAS OF THE
NORTH AvmiucA INDIAN 198 (1985).
26. Courts have generally accepted that the treaties were negotiated by the Indians
for the tribe. See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 688 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Each
tribe bargained as an entity for rights that are to be enjoyed communally.").
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a surplus of water beyond their own subsistence needs, nothing prevents
the tribe from engaging in commercial agriculture to provide income
and jobs for their members. 27 Thus, the PIA standard, while limiting
the Indians' water allocation, provides the maximum amount of that
resource for the uses envisioned at the time the reservation was estab-
lished.
B. Fishing Rights - The Moderate Income Standard
A. very different approach to the allocation of resources was adopted
by the Supreme Court in Washington. Washington arose out of a
controversy surrounding the treaties28 which created Indian reservations
in the Northwest. The Indians, while agreeing to cede 64,000,000 acres
of land to the United States government, remained concerned with
their continued ability to fish.29 Although the Indians would be allowed
to fish on their reservations, some of the most valuable fishing grounds
were located off the reservation. To satisfy these fears, the Indians
obtained a provision in the treaties guaranteeing "[t]he right to taking
fish at all usual.and accustomed grounds and stations ... in common
27. A remaining controversy is whether the Indians may lease unused portions of
the PIA allocation to off-reservation users. See generally Lee H. Storey, Comment,
Leasing Indian Water Rights Off the Reservation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 179 (1988).
28. The treaties in question are a series of treaties negotiated by Isaac Stevens and
the various Indian tribes. The language of the treaty was standardized and varied little
from tribe to tribe. In all, over 15 tribes were covered by the Washington decision.
These tribes, treaties, and dates of proclamation of the treaties in Washington are as
follows:
(a) Hoh, Quileute, Quinault Tribes; Treaty of Olympia, U.S.-Quinaielts et al., July
1, 1855 & Jan. 25, 1856, 12 Stat. 971.
(b) Lummi, Muckleshoot, Sauk-Suiattle, Stillaguamish, Upper Skagit Tribes; Treaty
of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, U.S.-Dwamish et al., 12 Stat. 927.
(c) Makah Tribe; Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan 31, 1855, U.S.-Makah, 12 Stat. 939.
(d) Nisqually, Puyallup, Skokomish, Squaxin Tribes; Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec.
26, 1154, U.S.-Nisqually et al., 10 Stat. 1132.
(e) Skokomish Tribe; Treaty of Point No Point, Jan. 26, 1855, U.S.-S'Klallams, 12
Stat. 933.
(f) Yaima Nation; Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, U.S.-Yakima Nation, 12
Stat. '951.
29. The culture and livelihood of the native peoples of the northwest coast of
North America were heavily dependent on fish. In particular the controversy in these
cases centered around four species of salmon: Chinook salmon, Oncorhynchus tshaw-
ytscha; Pink salmon, 0. gorbuscha; Coho salmon, 0. kisutch; and the Steelhead trout,
Salno gairdneri. The Indians relied heavily upon the seasonal runs of these anadromous
fish (fish that develop in fresh water, migrate to complete their development in the
ocean, and return to their natal streams to spawn). FAY G. COHEN, TREATiEs ON TRIAL
18-30 (1986) [hereinafter TREATs ON TRIAL]. The diet of the tribes reflected this
dependence. It is estimated that at the time the treaties were signed, the Indians ate
approxdmately one pound of salmon a day per person. John V. Byrne, Salmon is King
- Or Is It?, 16 ENv'rL. L. 343 (1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/9
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with all citizens of the Territory .... "0 This permitted the Indians
to have continued access to the off-reservation traditional fishing
locations. The exact meaning of these off-reservation fishing rights
was argued before the Supreme Court on several different occasions. 3'
In 1974 the district court in United States v. Washington, after an
exhaustive review of the record, reached a controversial decision de-
fining the extent of the Indians' treaty right to fish off the reservation.32
The court found that the treaty not only granted the Indians access
to the fishing grounds and an opportunity to catch fish at these off-
reservation sites, the treaty also established the Indians' right to catch
an actual portion of fish that passed through those locations. The
court decided that in those traditional fishing areas, the Indians were
entitled to a 50% share of the fish. This decision set off a storm of
protest in Washington, leading to widespread local disregard of the
district court's ruling. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court.3 The Supreme Court of Washington ordered
the state government not to comply with the federal court orders . 4
Faced with the open disregard of a federal court's rulings by a state
supreme court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
lower court's opinion.
In Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n," the Supreme Court essentially upheld the lower court's
ruling. 6 The Court agreed that the treaties provided more than mere
30. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, U.S.-Nisqually et al., art. 3, 10 Stat.
1132, 1133. The full text of article 3 reads as follows:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations,
is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the
Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for the purposes of curing,
together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and
pasturing their horses on open and unclaimed lands: Provided, however,
That they shall not take shell fish from any beds staked or cultivated by
citizens, and that they shall alter all stallions not intended for breeding
horses, and shall keep up and confine the latter.
Id. (emphasis supplied). All of the other treaties had essentially the same text.
31. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup III);
Washington Game Dep't v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup HI); Puyallup
Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup 1); Tulee v. Washing-
ton, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919);
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
32. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
33. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
34. Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 571 P.2d 1373 (Wash. 1977); Puget Sound
Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 565 P.2d 1151 (Wash. 1977).
35. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
36. The Court upheld the 50-50 split in the fish, but differed from the district
court's determination that fish caught for subsidence, religious ceremonies, and on the
reservation did not count toward the 50% limit. Washington, 443 U.S. at 687-88.
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access to the traditional fishing sites and upheld the 50% division. The
court found this case consistent with the same underlying principle as
Arizona: when determining the Indians' right to a scarce resource
which was once exclusively and thoroughly exploited by the Indians,
the Indians should be entitled to enough of the resource that they can
make a moderate living from that resource.37 In the Court's view, the
50 % figure was a ceiling that could be reduced depending upon the
specific needs of the Indian tribes. 8
C. One Standard or Two?
This comment views the two standards as conceptually distinct and
competing methods of resource allocation. Yet it is possible to question
whether Washington and Arizona in fact set forth two distinct stan-
dards. The apparent overlap between the standards stems from the
Supreme Court's suggestion that in adopting the moderate income
standard in Washington, its actions were in conformity with previous
cases, including Winters and Arizona 9 Evidence of this blending of
the standards is provided by the Washington Court notation that the
decision to limit Indians to a moderate income is derived directly from
Arizona.40 If this is true, then it would be incorrect to conclude that
the PIA standard exists separate from the moderate income standard.
Thus, one could argue that the Court seems to have accepted sub
silentio that these two phrases are one and the same. 41 Despite the
blurring of the standard, such a contention is hard to maintain in light
of the fundamental differences between the two standards.4 2
III. The PIA Standard and the Moderate
Income Standard Contrasted
One apparent distinction between the two standards is that the
moderate income standard is derived from an explicit treaty provision
37. Id. at 686.
38. Id. at 685.
39. Id. at 684.
4). Id. at 686.
41. "As in [Arizona] ... Indian treaty rights ... secure so much as, but no more
than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood - that is to say a moderate
living." Id.
42. See infra notes 43-59 and accompanying text. In any event it is hard to see
how the PIA standard only provides for a moderate income, when one of the chief
objections to the PIA standard is that it provided more water to the Indians than they
could use for subsistence. Thus when the state of Wyoming unsuccessfully sought to
challenge the PIA standard they urged the Court to reconsider the PIA standard on
the basis of Washington. In effect Wyoming wanted the new standard to provide enough
water to the Indians to maintain a moderate income for the tribes. Chambers, supra
note 22, at 162. This reinforces the idea that there is a distinction between applying the
PIA standard and the moderate income standard of Washington.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/9
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requiring that fishing be shared. The precise meaning of this require-
ment was heavily litigated 43 and turns on the definition of "sharing in
common." 44 In contrast, the Winters' water rights doctrine created a
formula for allocation "from whole cloth," without any basis in
specific treaty provisions. 4 This distinction suggests that the Arizona
Court had greater freedom in creating its formula for allocation.
However, in reality the treaties under examination in Washington,
beyond requiring some form of sharing, gave no specific guidance on
how to allocate the fish. For all practical purposes, the Court in
Washington was equally as free as the Court in Arizona to formulate
a solution.
There are, however, two major differences between the two stan-
dards. First, the moderate income standard enforces a fifty-fifty split
in the resource even before the Indians are permitted to remove their
share. By contrast, the PIA standard, while also limiting the Indians
right to a resource, computes the Indian water allotment solely on
tribal needs, without reference to other stream users. Second, the
moderate income standard, as its name implies, further limits the 50%
share of fish harvested by the Indians. 46 The PIA standard, on the
other hand, provides the tribe with water up to the practical ability
of the Indians to utilize the resource. Thus, while both decisions limit
the Indians' right to a resource, Washington's moderate income stan-
dard provides for an economic limitation, while the PIA limit is set
to the maximum feasible exploitation of the resource. This section will
examine the differences between the standards, highlighting the argu-
ments' weaknesses in advancing the moderate income standard.
A. The Fifty-Fifty Split
The most significant distinction between the two methods of allo-
cation is the fifty-fifty split mandated by Washington. The Arizona
formulation of the PIA does not limit the Indians to a fixed percentage,
but rather attempts, albeit imperfectly, to assess the needs of the tribe,
irrespective of competing needs of other stream users. Since the fifty-
fifty split is the essence of what is wrong with Washington, it is
important to examine the reasons for departing from a needs-based
approach, in favor of a percentage division.
The district court in Washington first concluded that the treaty
requires that both Indian and non-Indians be allowed to fish in the
off-reservation fishing grounds. 47 The court based this holding on the
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
45. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
46. Washington, 443 U.S. at 685.
47. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 333.
No. 1]
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clear language of the treaty: "the right of taking fish at all usual and
accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Territory." 48 It is
undisputed that such language envisions both Indian and non-Indian
being allowed to fish at these locations. Furthermore, the court noted
that the treaties created exclusive, unrestricted fishing rights for the
Indians on their reservations, hence implying that their rights off the
reservation were less than exclusive. 49 The court then concluded that
a division must be made between the fishing rights of Indians and
non-Indians at these sites. Relying on the definition found in the
dictionary,50 and the phrase "as intended and used in ... treaties,"
the court then concluded that "in common with" means sharing
equally.5
In upholding the lower court's opinion, the court of appeals ad-
vanced several arguments supporting the fifty-fifty split. First, the
court analogized from the two sides of this dispute and cotenants of
a piece of property.5 2 The court reasoned that when cotenants are
unable to agree on the utilization of the property, a court may order
the division of the property. Second, the court of appeals reasoned
that the tribes and the United States negotiated the treaties as formal
equads, and as a result the present day partition must reflect that initial
equality.53 Third, the judge's broad equitable discretion supports the
imposition of an equal division.5 4 Fourth, such a split "best effectuates
what the Indian parties would have expected if a partition of fishing
opportunities had been necessary at the time of the treaties." 5
When the Supreme Court upheld the fifty-fifty division, the Court
expanded upon these rationales but did not advance any new formu-
lations or theories. The Court cited past decisions, including Arizona,
as support for a proposition that both Indians and non-Indians must
share a disputed resource.56 After recognizing that none of its past
decisions mandated a fifty-fifty division, the Court declared that the
solution of equal division was an equitable solution.57 The Court
43. Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra note 30, at 1138 (emphasis added).
49. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 333.
50. Id. at 342. Reliance on the dictionary to provide meaning to words in a legal
dispute has been severely criticized. See generally James L. Weis, Note, Jurisprudence
by Webster's: The Role of the Dictionary in Legal Thought, 39 MERCER L. Rv. 961
(1988).
51. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 343.
52. Washington, 520 F.2d at 685.
5.-. Id. at 688.
54. Id. at 687.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 684. Needless to say, Arizona, while broadly supporting the need for
division of a resource, does not provide for a 50-50 split. Similarly, the other case cited,
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975), does not hold that an equal split is
required.
57. Washington, 443 U.S. at 685.
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explained the reasoning of the fifty-fifty allocation in a footnote:
The logic of the 50% ceiling is manifest. For an equal
division - especially between parties who presumptively
treated each other as equals - is suggested, if not neces-
sarily dictated, by the word "common" as it appears in the
treaties. Since the days of Solomon, such a division has
been accepted as a fair apportionment of a common asset,
and Anglo-American common law has presumed that divi-
sion when, as here, no other percentage is suggested by the
language of the agreement or the surrounding circum-
stances."
An analysis of the arguments advanced by the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals reveals that the justification of the fifty-fifty
split is supported by the following: (1) the treaty language requires
that both sides share, to some degree, the fishing in the traditional
fishing areas; (2) the courts are empowered to equitably divide a
resource that was once plentiful and now scarce; (3) equity requires
an even division; (4) the Indians and United States bargained for the
treaties as equals, suggesting an equal division of the resource; (5) the
original parties to the treaty would have agreed to an equal division
had they been confronted with the present scarcity; and (6) analogies
to the law of cotenancy support an equal division.
It is clear that the first two premises of the Court's argument are
true. There is no reasonable interpretation of the phrase "in common
with citizens of the Territory" that does not allow non-Indian fishing. 9
Neither can the present relative scarcity of fish be denied, nor the
broad powers of a court of equity. However, the remaining arguments
are highly questionable and deserve careful analysis.
1. The Equity Argument
The broadest reason a court can give for any solution is that
amorphous term "equity." The courts in Washington claimed that the
solution was an equitable division, conforming to notions of fairness
deeply rooted in our culture and property law.60 Such a claim contains
58. Id. at 686 n.27 (citing, e.g., 2 AimcA LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (A. James
Casner ed., 1952) [hereinafter LAW OF PROPERTY]; E. HoPmiNs, HAi BooK ON THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY § 209 (1896)).
59. Transcending the actual treaty language, it is inconceivable that the United
States intended to exclude non-Indians from these areas. More importantly, in light of
the canons of construction, it is difficult to believe that the Indians, who enjoyed a
surfeit of fish in a vast underpopulated land, contemplated that they alone could fish
these areas.
60. Washington, 443 U.S. at 686.
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two components: first, that a scarce item should be shared between
equals; and second, that the parties should share evenly.
The first strand of the argument suggests that since salmon are now
scarce, sharing is required. But implicit in that statement is the as-
sumption that neither party had any responsibility for the present
scarcity. Such an assumption cannot be maintained. The Indians agreed
to -the treaties at a time when they constituted 75% of the population
of the Territory of Washington.6' The fish were abundant and more
than enough to meet all Indian needs, including religious purposes,
subsistence, and commerce.A6 The present scarcity of fish can be squarely
blamed upon the triple attacks on fishing - all created by non-Indians
-of overfishing, damming of rivers,6 and destruction of fish spawn-
ing habitats by logging and pollution. 64 These non-Indian actions
created a scarcity of fish that forced judicial intervention to determine
how to divide the remaining catch between the Indians and non-
Indians. 65 Why then does equity require the Indian, who relied on
fishing for livelihood, whose rights to maintain that livelihood are
guaranteed by solemn treaty, and who bears no responsibility for the
scarcity, be forced to split evenly the remaining fish in their traditional
areas? The equities of the situation are clear and one-sided: without
the specific treaty language to the contrary, there would be no com-
pelling reason for the Indians to share with non-Indians in these
common areas.
The second strand of the equity argument postulates that if the
resource must be shared, then the equitable solution is a fifty-fifty
61. Id.
62. Id. at 676.
63. Dams have reduced the salmon habitat in the Columbia Basin by over 90,000
square miles, representing 55% of the original area. Byrne, supra note 29, at 344.
64. JA Ms A. CRuTCHmILD & Guiuo PONTECORVO, TBE PACIHC SALMON Fistmus
125 (1969). The decrease in the numbers of salmon in the Puget Sound area, the location
of most of the tribes in the Washington litigation, is astounding. It is estimated that
between 1860 and the turn of the century the total number of salmon in the area
declined by 50%. RussEL BARSH, THE WAsmNGTON FisI No Rxoirrs CONtROVBRSY: AN
ECONOMIC CRTQuE 18 (1977). In 1913 nearly forty million salmon were caught. By
1964 that number had plummeted to slightly more than one million. CRUTcHMF.LD &
PoNTI:CoRvo, supra, at 208-09.
However, recent intensive efforts, including the largest effort at biological restoration
in the world, give hope that the salmon decline can be arrested and that fishing stocks
will increase. Presently over $100 million a year is dedicated to salmon recovery. Kai
N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Restoration Under the Northwest Power Act, 16 ENVm. L.
430, 436 (1986). The centerpiece of this recovery is the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 839a-839h (1988), which attempts to mitigate the disastrous impact of hydroelectric
dams on migrating salmon.
65. Clearly, if the fish were abundant and ample to meet both Indian and non-
Indian needs, there would be no reason for parties to be concerned with the exact
meaning of these treaties.
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split in fishing. Yet despite the superficial gloss of schoolyard fairness,
the fifty-fifty split is anything but fair to the Indian fisherman. The
fifty-fifty figure has no basis in any treaty provision, and nothing in
the history surrounding the treaties suggests such a split. Why then is
the court imposing this particular ratio? Returning to the footnote in
Washington that purports to explain the equity of the fifty-fifty split,
the court states: "Since the days of Solomon, such a division has been
accepted as a fair apportionment of a common asset, and Anglo-
American common law has presumed that division when, as here, no
other percentage is suggested by the language of the agreement or the
surrounding circumstances.' ' s
As an initial consideration, it cannot be seriously suggested that the
famous tale of King Solomon and the baby provides any guidance for
the complex question of deciding the correct allocation between com-
peting parties in a treaty dispute. 7 Such a tale provides, at best,
reinforcement of the intuitive notion that fair means fifty-fifty split.
But even assuming that equal division is enshrined-in our law as the
only solution from Solomon's day on, there must be a stronger reason
then ancient precedent to apply such a solution today. In a famous
passage, then-Judge Holmes said, "jilt is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV." 65 If this is true, then how much more revolting to blindly
follow precedent from the days of Solomon.
Indeed, if the equity argument is to be taken seriously, then general
principles of equity should be applied to the case. What exactly a
court means by an equitable solution is difficult to discern. As presently
applied, equity suggests merely a rubric for a court to justify a solution
that tends to depart from precedent, or has weak support in the case
law, and offers a proscriptive remedy to a problem.69 The courts tend
to ignore the traditional body of equity jurisprudence when invoking
equity as a rationale. Ignoring these general principles of equity may
be unwise, since they provide some restraints on the courts in fash-
ioning equitable relief. Without any restraints, equity becomes a pow-
erful judicial tool that frees a court from conforming to precedent.70
Examining the general equitable principles, one finds that while
equity often in fact does mean equality, a party who invokes equity
66. Washington, 443 U.S. at 686 n.27 (citing, e.g., 2 LAw oF PROPERTY, supra
note 58, § 6.5; HoPnmms, supra note 58, § 209.).
67. One obvious weakness with such an analogy is that the essence of the Solomon
story is not that an equal division of the baby was truly just, but rather the wisdom
of Solomon was revealed by his threat to harm the baby in order to discover the true
mother. M.AITHA L. MiNow, STRuciuRE or PROCEDURE 447 (Robert M. Cover & Owen
M. Fiss eds., 1979).
68. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAnv. L. Rv. 457, 469 (1897).
69. GARY L. McDowa., EQUrrY AD THE CoNsrruioN 9 (1982).
70. Id. at 3.
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must come before the court with clean hands. 71 Furthermore, equity
looks to the intent of the parties, not the form.72 These principles
suggest that the non-Indians, who have a long record of violating the
treaties and of denying the Indians their rights,73 cannot be the reci-
pients of equitable relief, for the non-Indians' hands are not clean.
By looking to intent over form, the courts should be required to look
to the intent of the parties in the creation of the treaty. It is just this
analysis of intent that is lacking in Washington. Had the Court ex-
amined the intent of the parties, no doubt they would not have utilized
an equal division. 74
71. HENRY L. MCClINOCK, PmuNcr'ss oF EQuIrT 52 (2d ed. 1948).
72. Id.
73. In United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), the Court found that the
state was interfering with Indian fishing rights. This pattern of interference and denial
of Indian treaty rights continued almost unabated until the original Washington decision.
Although the federal courts were receptive to Indian claims, state courts were openly
hostile. Washington State Supreme Court Justice Bausman wrote:
The premise of Indian sovereignty we reject. The treaty is not to be
interpreted in this light. At no time did our ancestors in getting title to
this continent ever regard the aborigines as other than mere occupants,
and incompetent occupants, of the soil.... Only that title was esteemed
which came from white men.
The Indian was a child, and a dangerous child of nature, to be protected
and restrained. In his nomadic life, he was to be left, as long as civilization
did not demand his region. When it did demand his region, he was to be
allotted a more confined area with permanent subsistence....
These arrangements were but the announcement of our benevolence
which, notwithstanding our frequent frailties, has been continuously dis-
played. Neither Rome nor sagacious Britain ever dealt more liberally with
their subject races than we with these savage tribes, whom it was generally
tempting and always easy to destroy and whom we have so often permitted
to squander vast areas of fertile land before our eyes.
State v. Towessnote, 154 P. 805, 807 (Wash. 1916). Although the above quotation is
over 70 years old, the hostility of the State of Washington toward Indian fishing claims
contimes to the present day. The initial attempt to implement the Washington decision
led to acts of violence and vandalism against Indian fishermen and their gear. H.R.
REP. No. 1243, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6793,
6808. In affirming the district court opinion in Washington, Judge Burns concurred,
noting:
The record in this case, and the history set forth in the Puyallup and
Antoine cases, among others, make it crystal clear that it has been recal-
citrance of Washington State officials (and their vocal non-Indian com-
inercial and sports fishing allies) which produced the denial of Indian
rights requiring intervention by the district court. This responsibility should
neither escape notice nor be forgotten.
Washington, 520 F.2d at 693 (Bums, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit also remarked
that, with the exception of school desegregation, a district court had never met such a
concerted public and official efforts to frustrate the rulings of a federal court. Puget
Sound Gilnetters Ass'n v. District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated
sub nom. Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
74. It is this examination of intent that forms the central tenet of this comment's
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The thrust of these equity arguments is not that the Indians should
share the fishing; on the contrary, equity suggests that further reduc-
tions, or even total elimination of non-Indians' percentage of the catch
may be required. However, a total exclusion of non-Indian fishing
cannot be reconciled with the treaty language, which requires sharing
in common. Nonetheless, the fact that a strong argument based on
equity could support such a contention highlights the weakness of
argument that equity requires a fifty-fifty division.
2. Cotenancy Analogies
The footnote in Washington5 also advanced a cotenancy argument,
stating, "Anglo-American common law has presumed that division
when, as here, no other percentage is suggested by the language of
the agreement or the surrounding circumstances. 17 6 The Court is quite
correct that the treaties are silent as to any specific ratio. But it is
noteworthy that the Court supports this statement with citations to
property law, in particular the law on cotenancy. The cited proposition
that follows the above quote states that, "Itihough each tenant in
common may have a share greater or smaller than the shares of the
other, if their shares are not fixed in deed or will creating the tenancy
in common, they take in equal shares."77 By citing to the substantive
law of cotenancy, the court implies that such an analogy has appli-
cation in determining allocations under the treaty. That quotation, by
itself, does support the equal division of the property. But reaching
that conclusion ignores other salient components of the cotenancy
relationship. To illustrate the weakness of relying of cotenancy as a
justification for a fifty-fifty split it is necessary to flesh out the
cotenancy analogy.
Although unstated, in order to utilize the cotenancy argument, the
Court is suggesting that the Indians and the non-Indians share a
common estate in the fish that existed at the time of the treaty. Now,
years later, the cotenants are petitioning the Court for a partition of
the estate. The Court then cites with approval the proposition that
when no specific split is suggested by the treaty, the law favors an
equal division. But such an analysis ignores another factor that affects
the final division of cotenant property, the doctrine of waste:
Cotenants stand in a fiduciary relationship one to the other.
Each has the right to full enjoyment of the property, but
proposed unified standard. Therefore, the examination of intent will be discussed more
thoroughly in that section. See infra notes 116-29 and accompanying text.
75. Washington, 443 U.S. at 686 n.27 (citing, e.g., 2 LAW OF PROPERTY, supra
note 58, § 6.5; HopxiNs, supra note 58, § 209.).
76. Id.
77. 2 LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 58, § 6.5.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
must use it as a reasonable property owner. A cotenant is
liable for waste if he destroys the property or abuses it so
as to permanently impair its value. A court will enjoin the
commission of waste. 78
Waste may be defined as destructive permanent damage to the
common property.79 Continuing the cotenancy analogy, since the In-
dians and the non-Indians share the common fishing grounds, the non-
Indians, as the party who possessed and controlled the estate, 0 would
be accountable for any permanent destruction of the fishing "estate."
Since the non-Indians caused the reduction of the fish runs in these
common grounds measured from their historic levels at the creation
of the fish "estate,"'" the non-Indian fishermen are arguably guilty of
waste. Accepting that non-Indian fishermen have permanently de-
stroyed a portion of the fishing estate, 2 a court dividing the estate
today would be required to compensate the Indians for the waste.
Such compensation could take the form of monetary payments, known
as ovvelty,13 or an unequal division of the remaining estate. 4 Since the
property in question is not a tangible area, but rather an estate of
fish, an unequal division of the estate would be granting the Indians
more than 50% of the fish runs.85
78. Washington, 520 F.2d at 685.
79. 2 WILLI F. WALSH, COmmENTARrES ON THE LAw OF Rm PROPERTY § 131
(1947). A subsidiary question arises if there can be waste of a renewable resource. A
cotenant is not responsible to other cotenants for profits which did not reduce the
permanent value of the property. If the resource is renewable, then there cannot be a
claim for waste. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States, 573 F.2d 1123, 1135
n.4 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J., concurring), vacated sub nom. Washington v. Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). Thus, it could be argued that waste would only exist
"up to the point where fishing activity reduces the quantity of fish in future runs." Id.
80. Although Indian access to the common grounds continued during the entire
period of the treaty, numerous lawsuits were required to maintain these rights. The
non-Indians clearly dominated the common areas, leading to ever-smaller Indian fish
catches. Furthermore, Indian access alone would not mitigate the fact that the non-
Indians were responsible for the environmental damage that caused damage to the
"fishing estate."
81. See supra note 64-65.
82. Although it can be argued that over-fishing is only a temporary reduction in
the yield, the damming of rivers and destruction of breeding habitat would constitute
a permanent reduction.
83. Owelty is a financial payment imposed by a court to correct the imbalance in
the value of the parcels allocated to former cotenants. RoGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM
B. SToEBUCK & DALE A. WHIAN, THE LAw OF PROPERTY § 5.13 (1984).
84. Id. § 5.12.
85. The argument that the Indians should receive a greater than 50% share of the
present fish runs goes as follows: If the initial fish estate represents 100%, the Indians
upon partition, are entitled to 50% of the initial amount of fish that ran in the common
areas. This follows from accepting the argument that since the terms of the agreement
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/9
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It could be maintained that the above arguments extend the coten-
ancy analogy beyond its original meaning. Yet the above results flow
directly from a full application of the relevant property law. Perhaps
for this perceived weakness, use of the cotenancy analogy has not met
with universal approval.86 In a concurring opinion, then-Circuit Judge
Kennedy criticized the majority's adoption of cotenancy as a rationale
for upholding the fifty-fifty split in the fish:
Most importantly, the concept of cotenancy does not help
the court determine what share of the disputed rights should
be allocated to each of the parties. By relying so heavily
upon the theory, the court seems to imply that an even
apportionment follows from creation of a cotenancy; but,
of course, it does not. Cotenancy is not synonymous with
entitlement to equal shares.87
3. The Formal Equals Argument
Another questionable rationale, suggested by the Supreme Court to
support an equal division, is the argument that since the two parties
dealt as equals in the bargaining of the treaty, they must now accept
an equal division of a resource. Although this argument possesses a
certain appealing legal logic, such a contention should be rejected.
This argument is rooted in the recognition that the Indian tribes who
negotiated with the United States were treated as a kind of sovereign
entity.88 While superficially valid, a holding that the Indians were the
formal equals of the United States in their treaty negotiations openly
were silent as to division, an equal division of the property is required. The present
runs of fish are considerably less due to non-Indian waste of the common estate relative
to when the treaties were signed. Thus, to give the Indians their 50% of the initial fish
runs would allow them far more than 50% of the present runs.
86. The Supreme Court has taken a dim view of using property law to justify one's
position in this controversy. The Court noted that non-treaty fishermen could not rely
on property law concepts in excluding Indians. Washington, 443 U.S. at 84. Although
the context of the opinion was that the Court was referring to excluding Indians from
their traditional fishing grounds by refusing them the right to transit adjoining private
property, it does suggest limited strength of property analogies.
87. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States, 573 F.2d 1123, 1135-36 (9th
Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J., concurring), vacated sub nom. Washington v. Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (emphasis added). Despite his strong attack on the cotenancy
analogy when sitting on the Court of Appeals, Justice Kennedy was silent when the
Supreme Court adopted the cotenancy analogy to support the equal division.
88. The complex issue of Indian sovereignty is beyond the scope of this note.
Although the exact status of Indians has remained in flux, over the years tribes have
almost consistently been viewed as some kind of sovereign entity. See generally RUSSEL
L. BARsH & JAsEs Y. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRmEs AND PoLmcAL LmERTY
(1980).
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ignores the widely recognized disparity between the parties 9 The vast
difference in understanding, including the significance, content, and
effect of a treaty gave rise to the "pro-Indian" canons of treaty
construction.9 These canons provide that treaties with the Indians are
to be liberally construed in favor of the Indians and as the Indians
would have understood them.9' Additionally, ambiguous terms are to
be resolved in favor of the Indians. 92 These canons have been repeatedly
adopted by the Supreme Court in interpreting Indian treaties.93 Why
the "formal equality" of the parties should have any practical signif-
icance is difficult to grasp. The entire thrust of the canons of con-
struction is that indeed, Indian equality is only "formal," and that a
court should not draw too much from the actual wording or legal
setting. Even accepting that the Indians were the formal equals of the
United States in the treaty process, it does not follow that such an
"equality" must be translated into the mathematical equality of a
fifty-fifty division.
4. Equal Division Would Have Been
Supported by Treaty Signatories
A final reason given for the even distribution is the argument that
the parties to the treaty would have agreed to an even distribution,
had they envisioned the present scarcity of fishY4 Of course such
historical second-guessing can never be disproved, but it is alarming
that the courts which have made this statement have failed to offer
any proof or argument to support this notion. In fact, all the evidence
concerning the Indian tribes seemingly points to the opposite conclu-
sion.
As previously mentioned, fishing was integral, indeed fundamental,
to the northwest tribes. Their culture, lifestyle, religion, even the names
89. One typical problem in interpretation of treaties is that the Indians rarely had
any understanding of the formal wording and legal nuances of the treaty language. This
problem was further compounded in the Washington case by the fact that the treaties
were negotiated without any direct translation from English to the Indian languages.
Rather, the negotiations were conducted in a common Chinook trading jargon. Wash-
ington, 384 F. Supp. at 356. This jargon contained a limited 300-word commercial
vocabulary and did not include many of the terms used in the treaty. Id.
90. FELIX S. ComN's HANDBOOK oF FEDRAL INDIAN LAW 221-25 (Rennard Strick-
land et al. eds., 1982).
91. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Choate v.
Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104
F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939).
92. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, '567-77
(1908).
93. Id.
94. Washington, 443 U.S. at 685.
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of the months of the year, all revolved around salmon.9 The Indians
demanded that any treaty provide for the continued taking of fish for
all the Indians' needs. It stretches the imagination to suppose that a
foreign invading people could obtain a agreement from these Indians
which provided that should the non-Indian profligate ways to reduce
the number of fish that the Indians could no longer catch sufficient
fish for their needs, the Indians must split the remaining fish equally
with the non-Indians.9 6 Instead, a more likely scenario would have the
Indians insisting that their needs be met fully, before the newcomers
could take any fish. That the Indians were amenable to sharing the
immense bounty of fish which historically existed cannot be distorted
into a suggestion that the Indians would have engaged in altruism.
Interesting results flow from the hypothesis that the original Indian
signatories, confronted with scarcity, would have demanded their share
of the fish first. As mentioned previously, one such use of the fish,
already developed before the non-Indians, was commerce.9 Thus, in
addition to securing fish for subsistence, and religious reasons, the
Indians would have demanded fish to maintain their commercial re-
lations. This suggests that rather than supporting an even allocation
of the fish, the original signatories, had they been confronted with
scarcity, would have demanded an appropriate amount of fish for the
Indians to engage in commercial enterprise.
B. Income Limitation
The second fundamental difference between the PIA standard and
the moderate income standard is the imposition of a predetermined
economic level that limits the Indians' ability to exploit the resource.
95. One of the litigants in Washington, the Quileute Tribe, had named four months
of the year after different salmon runs: January, beginning of the spawning of the steel
head salmon; February, strong spawning time of the salmon; September, the time of
the black salmon; October, the time of the silver salmon. TRaTms ON TRuAL, supra
note 29, at 23.
96. Even the initial treaties generated much opposition among the Indians. As one
chief said against the Stevens' treaties:
If your mothers were here in this country who gave you birth, and suckled
you and while you were suckling some persons came and took away your
mother and left you alone and sold your mother, how would you feel
then? This our mother country as if we drew our lives from her.
CouxLND L. SMrH, SALMON Fismums OF THE CoLuMBlA 14 (1979).
In fact, if it wasn't for the threat that failure to sign the treaty would lead to their
lands being overrun by white settlers, it is questionable if the original treaties would
have been signed at all. Id. Thus, it is even more unlikely had these same parties agreed
to greater reductions in the right to fish.
97. The Indians would dry and the pulverize the salmon and place the ground dried
salmon in baskets lined with salmon skin. The resulting product, which was extremely
long lasting, was then traded with other tribes. The trade was quite complex, involving
tribes as far away as the Plains Sioux. See id.
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While PIA provides no restriction or cut off of water once the Indians
reach a moderate level of income, the moderate income standard clearly
does.9" The reasons advanced for this limitation are difficult to rec-
oncile with the rationale underlying the PIA standard.
In one sense, however, the entire question may be of more theoretical
than practical relevance. At present the Indians take nearly 50% of
the total catch in the common areas, yet this provides them with only
a moderate income at best. 99 In 1979, for example, the median family
income in Washington was $21,635, while the median income for a
Indian fishing household was $11,024.100 Since the Indian fishing in-
comes are unlikely to grow so high as to invite challenge, courts may
never be forced to define the phrase "moderate-income." Hence it
does not appear that the moderate income restriction will have much
impact on the amount of fishing done by the Indians. However, the
absence of such an impact alone does not justify the adoption of this
standard.
One potential danger of the "moderate-income" standard is that it
will serve as a precedent in cases where the impact will not be so
slight. In a recent case, Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Wisconsin,'0' the
court adopted the moderate income standard of Washington in a case
involving hunting and trapping rights. Following Washington, the court
restricted the Indians to 50% of the total catch of animals, with a
"moderate income" cap. Again Indian treaty rights are being subject
to a potential downward revision by the limitation of "moderate
income."' 02 However, similar to Washington, the income derived from
98. Indeed the Court in Washington stressed that the Indians were entitled to no
more than enough fish to provide a moderate income:
Accordingly, while the maximum possible allocation to the Indians is fixed
at 50%, the minimum is not; the latter will, upon proper submission to
the District Court, be modified in response to changing circumstances. If,
for example, a tribe should dwindle to just a few members, or if it should
find other sources of support that lead it to abandon its fisheries, a 45%
or 50% allocation of an entire run that passes through its customary
fishing grounds would be manifestly inappropriate because the livelihood
of the tribe under those circumstances could not reasonably require an
allotment of a large number of fish.
Washington, 443 U.S. at 686-87.
99. In 1983 Indian fishermen caught 2,145,373 fish, representing 43.5% of the total
catch. Pre-Washington Indian fish catches averaged 5% of the total catch. TRATIEs ON
TaRA, supra note 29, at 155.
100. Id. at 162. The Lummi Tribe was one of the larger tribes affected by the
Washington decision. Over the period of 1981-84, out of 622 Lummi tribal fishermen,
85% had gross earnings of less than $10,000 a year from fishing. As of 1985, 90% of
all Lummi fishermen earned a net income below the federal poverty line. DANIEL
BOXBEROER, To FisH I, COMMON 173-75 (1989).
101. 740 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
102. Id. at 1417-18. As with the fishing income, income derived from hunting and
trapping by the Chippewa Indians does not approach the moderate income cap placed
on these activities. Id. at 1418.
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hunting and fishing is so meager there seems to be little practical
danger that Indian hunting will actually have to be reduced to meet
this standard.
An additional problem posed by the moderate income standard is
its potential to conflict with the fifty-fifty allocation. The court in
Washington noted the fifty-fifty split was a ceiling. 103 However, the
moderate income standard may be interpreted to constitute both a
ceiling and a floor. Under this view the Indians would be allowed to
take enough fish to obtain a moderate income even if this requires
catching more than 50% of the fish in the common areas. In United
States v. Adair,104 the Ninth Circuit was required to determine whether
a tribe has the reserved water rights to maintain water flows through
the reservation to permit the continuance of hunting and fishing rights
granted by the treaty. Finding support in Washington, the court held
that the Indians did have the right to appropriate as much water as
was needed to maintain hunting and fishing. 15 The court noted:
[The Washington court] stated "that Indian treaty rights to
a natural resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively
exploited by the Indians secures so much as, but not more
than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood
- that is to say, a moderate living. Implicit in this "mod-
erate living" standard is the conclusion that Indian tribes
are not generally entitled to the same level of exclusive use
and exploitation of a natural resource that they enjoyed at
the time they entered into the treaty reserving their interests
in the resource, unless, of course no lesser level will supply
them with a moderate living' °6
This suggests that the fifty-fifty allocation would have to be altered
to meet the moderate income needs of the Indians.
Perhaps the greatest danger in the imposition of the moderate income
standard is its implication for the concepts of Indian economic devel-
opment and self-sufficiency. A growing body of legislation 0 7 and case
law'0 supports the premise that a chief goal of congressional activity
concerning Indians is the economic development of the tribe. Thus the
103. Washington, 443 U.S. at 685.
104. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
105. Id. at 1415.
106. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
107. Indian Minerals Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1988);
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-
450n (1988); Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1453 (1988).
108. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Laplante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987); New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 325 (1983); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
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Supreme Court's imposition of an earnings limitation seems a curious
cross purpose. Of course, if the moderate income standard were part
of the text of the treaty, or clearly derived from the treaty language,
then the Supreme Court would be bound to interpret the treaty with
such a limitation. But, as noted above, the moderate income standard
is a pure invention of the Court, with no grounding in the treaty
language.1 9
Perhaps the reasoning behind the inclusion of this standard can be
gleaned from the dissents' argument in the Washington opinion. The
dissent feared that the fifty-fifty split "is likely to result in an extraor-
dinary economic windfall to Indian fishermen in the commercial fish
market by giving them a substantial position in the market.""10 The
majority may have been sensitive to this criticism and perhaps included
the moderate income standard as a way of limiting the economic
windfall.' Whatever the reason for its inclusion, the moderate income
standard stands in stark contrast to the PIA standard. PIA offers the
tribes an ability to expand their agricultural activity free of any res-
trictions. The moderate income standard sets up a barrier that the
Indians cannot cross.
IV. Harmonizing the Standard - Intent of the Treaty
Despite the Supreme Court's suggestion that the two decisions,
Arizona and Washington, are in harmony," 2 the foregoing analysis
has demonstrated that serious differences exist between the two stan-
dards. Having two standards, one for water and the other for other
resources, leads to a basic injustice. Water rights receive a relatively
favorable treatment, while other treaty rights are subjected to a mod-
erate income cap. Rather than having two competing standards gov-
erning resource allocation, one unified standard should be applied.
Although canons of treaty construction govern questions of treaty
interpretation," 3 such canons cannot provide a solution for resource
109. "[The Supreme Court] unearthed the moderate income standard." Robert C.
Lothrop, The Misplaced Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Columbia River Basin Fishery
Mitigation, 16 ENvTL. L. 517, 545 (1986). "The Court confused the question of the
appropriate allocation of fish by stating in dicta [the moderate income standard]." Peter
C. Mason, Comment, United States v. Washington, (Phase I1). The Indian Fishing
Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENvTh. L. 469, 482 (1982).
110. Washington, 443 U.S. at 705-06 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent failed to
explain what exactly would be so awful if, in fact, the Washington decision did grant
an economic windfall to the poorest and most disadvantaged citizens of the state.
111. In any event, the reality of the economics of the salmon fishery show that even
without the moderate income limitation, the Indian fisherman, while definitely improving
their economic lot, would have not reached an extremely high income level. See supra
notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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allocation because the treaty may be silent as to the question of
allocation. While the proposed standard relies on the established canons
of treaty construction, it is not strictly a proposal for a new canon of
construction.
The proposed standard assumes that the treaty itself is silent on the
question of resource allocation. If the resource is mentioned in the
treaty, then the established rules of treaty interpretation should be
applied to that provision. Yet as illustrated by Washington, a treaty
can mention a resource, and even attempt to allocate a resource, but
do so in a manner so ambiguous as to require later interpretation.
The new standard is stated as follows: resources should be allocated
based on the importance of the resource in fulfilling the intent of the
treaty. This requires two separate determinations: first, the broad intent
or the goal of the treaty vis-a-vis the Indians must be ascertained;
second, the focus of this inquiry is limited to what both parties thought
the treaty was to accomplish for the Indians.
The exclusive focus on the intent as it regards the Indians is suggested
by the accepted canons of construction of Indian treaties. These canons
have an exclusive focus on Indians. They direct attention to the
concerns of Indians, the impact upon the Indians, and the intent of
treaties as they regarded Indians. A resource allocation dispute, which
is often closely related to treaty construction, should likewise center
exclusively on Indian interests and understandings.
This does not mean that both parties' intent should not be examined.
Rather, the proposed standard also examines what the non-Indians
thought the treaty would accomplish as it regarded the fate of the
Indians. For example, in Arizona, the intent of the non-Indians in
settling the Indians on reservations was crucial to determining that the
United States reserved water.11 4
Once the intent of the parties has been established, a separate
determination must be made to assess the importance of the disputed
resource in the furtherance of this intent. If the resource plays a
fundamental role in the realization of that intent, then the allocation
between Indians and non-Indians should reflect that importance. In
Arizona, for example, the Court noted that the lands upon which the
Indians were settled were arid."' The Court also found that the intent
of the treaty was to settle the Indians on agricultural settlements. Since
the rainfall was insufficient to permit agriculture, irrigation and di-
versions of water from the river was required. The absolute necessity
of water to fulfill the intent of the treaty justified the creation of the
114. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
115. "It can be said without overstatement that when the Indians were put on the
reservations they were not considered to be located in the most desirable area of the
Nation." Id. at 598.
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reserved water rights doctrine. The Court, having determined that
water was vital to accomplish the intent, adopted a standard of allo-
cation that would insure that this resource would be allocated in
sufficient quantities.
This section of the comment first examines why intent should be
the key to resource allocation. The 'section then applies this new
standard to the Washington conflict.
A. Intent of Treaties and Resource Allocation
Treaties between the United States and the Indians have often been
viewed as a contract between two sovereign nations." 6 As in other
contract disputes, the intention of the parties to the contract controls
any attempt to interpret that contract." 7 Accepted canons of construc-
tion require that in cases of dispute, the Indians' intention in the
treaty is to be favored."'
The primacy of intent in determination of reserved water rights was
established in United States v. New Mexico,"' where the Court held
that "[e]ach time this Court has applied thO 'implied-reservation-of-
water doctrine,' it has carefully examined both the asserted water right
and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved, and con-
cluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would
be entirely defeated."'1 This requirement of showing the intent of the
treaty has become a regular feature of water rights litigation.' 2' Nor
is the concept restricted to reserved water rights cases. In other contexts
as well, courts have examined the intent of both parties to a treaty in
interpreting the treaty language.I Under the proposed standard, intent
of both parties will be examined.
Emerging from Indian treaties is a broad intent by the non-Indians
116. Washington, 443 U.S. at 675; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
117. V/ashington, 443 U.S. at 675.
118. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
119. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
120. Id. at 700.
121. In Wyoming v. Owl Creek Irrigation Dist., 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd
sub norn. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), the court examined no less
than 348 separate exhibits offered by Wyoming to show the intent and purpose of the
treaty.
122. Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Wisconshi, '740 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (W.D. Wis.
1990); United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 832 (9t' Cir. 1976), vacated on other
grounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977) (intent Qf ;U.S. to provide tribe with permanent home
gives tribe right to regulate resources); Moore v. United States, 157 F.2d 760, 762 (9th
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 827 (1947) (intent of treaty to encourage Indian
economic independence requires inclusion of valuable riverbed and tidal area within
reservation); Alaska Fisheries v. Uhited States; 248 U.S. 78, 140 (1918) (intent of treaty
to allow Indians to become industrious, independent and self-supporting requires support
of Indian industrial and commercial fishing).
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of "civilizing of the savage."'12 Applying this broad intent, courts
have construed treaties in a manner promoting these values. For
example, in United States v. Finch,24 the Supreme Court upheld the
right of the Crow Tribe to maintain a fishery. Despite the fact the
Crow were not a traditional fishing people, the Court found that the
fishery was consistent with the broad goal that attempted to reorient
the tribe to agricultural and other pursuits.lu Significantly, this suggests
that the intent need not be interpreted narrowly to include only the
actually mentioned terms and concepts of the treaty. Clearly in the
Finch situation neither party "intended" that the Crow would develop
a fishery. Nor did the treaty mention in any way the creation of a
fishery. But since self-sufficiency was consistent with the general intent
of the treaty, the Court found intent to support the Crow fishing
activity in the treaty.126
Another example of this broad interpretation of intent is found in
the further refinements given to the reserved water rights doctrine.
The Winters reserved water rights doctrine depends on an examination
of the intent in the formation of the reservation.12 7 Yet while the
agricultural intent found in the treaties forms the rationale for the
reservation of water, the case law does not limit the use of water to
only agricultural uses.'2 Indian tribes have utilized the reserved water
calculated under the PIA standard for a variety of uses including
mining, industry, and recreation. 29 Thus, while the treaty's agricultural
intent provided the general rationale for the reservation of water, it
did not narrowly limit the tribe to only those uses that would be
consistent with that intent.
This tends to illustrate that intent has traditionally played a crucial
role in determining treaty rights, and should, as the new standard
suggests, remain at the heart of any attempt to allocate resources under
treaties. Perhaps the utility of such a new standard can be seen by its
application to Washington.
B. Application of the New Standard to Washington
Applying the proposed standard to the situation in Washington first
123. FRANcis P. PRuCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 135-36 (1986).
124. 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977)
(per curiam).
125. Id. at 833-34.
126. Id. at 832.
127. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
128. Lee H. Storey, Leasing Indian Water Off the Reservation: A Use Consistent
with the Reservation's Purpose, 76 CAL. L. Rnv. 179, 198 (1988).
129. Id. at 182. By statute, tribal lands and related water can be leased by non-
Indians for a variety of purposes. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1988).
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requires that the intent of the treaty be determined. From the Indian
perspective one overriding factor emerges - the importance of fishing
rights to meet the needs of the tribe. The non-Indian intent of the
treaty was more complex. An obvious objective was to secure vast
tracts of land and to regulate the activities of the Indian tribes. 30
Another element of the non-Indian intent that runs through the treaty
is the attempt to assimilate and civilize the Indians. The treaty expresses
this intent in several locations by fostering Indian economic activity.
In article 5 of the treaty, the United States agreed to pay the Indians
money to assist in the agricultural settlement of the land.' But this
intent was not limited to agriculture alone; the United States expressed
concern for general economic development. For example, article 10 of
the treaty set up agricultural and trade schools.3 2 This strongly suggests
that the intent of the United States was to provide the Indians with
the tools needed for economic self-sufficiency.
After finding that the intent broadly supports Indian economic
development, the next question asks what role the disputed resource
should play in that development. Clearly fishing is the obvious resource
that the Indians could use to advance their economic position. The
central and crucial role of fishing in the life and economy of the tribes
is clear. Since the role of Indian fishing is central, the allocation must
now be made from that perspective. The exact allocation may not be
made by the court, considering, as always, the specific provisions of
the treaty in light of the treaties' intent.'
The intent of the treaties in the Washington case may be summarized
as encouragement of Indian economic development, while preserving
the primacy of fishing. This suggests that the central feature of the
allocation would be to allow the development of a commercial fishery
in the common areas. Such a feature would necessarily require a great
increase of the share of fish caught by Indians to the detriment of the
share caught by non-Indian commercial fishermen.
In fact, that was the exact result under the Washington decision,
for it was the non-Indian fishermen who were required to reduce their
share of fish. Before the Washington decision, Indian fishermen were
taking less than 20% of the fish in the common areas, whereas
presently the Indians have reached the 50% figure. This expansion of
130. Not only did the treaties require cession of lands, but they also imposed a
series of restrictions on Indian dealings with non-Americans. Treaty of Medicine Creek,
supra note 30, art. 12.
131. Id. art. 3.
132. Id.
133. This proposal does not suggest that specific treaty provisions should not be
honored, only that the entire treaty be interpreted in light of the intent of the treaty.
Specific provisions must still be enforced, although they may have to be reinterpreted
in order to accomplish the general intent of the treaty.
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Indian fishing has come at the expense of the non-Indian fishermen
whose catch was reduced proportionally to the Indians' increase.
Reduction of non-Indian fishing was a controversial course. Rec-
ognition that the Washington decision would result in such a reduction
was, of course, the reason for its violent rejection by non-Indian
fishermen. Furthermore, the dissent criticized the majority in Wash-
ington for unfairly singling out and burdening non-Indian fishermen. 13 4
This suggests that an even greater reduction in non-Indian fishing
would be an intensely unpopular solution.
Although it is true that non-Indian fishermen have been forced to
reduce the amount of fish caught, it does not follow that further
reductions may not be appropriate. First, if the courts intend to be
serious about fairly interpreting treaties, then non-Indian fishermen's
catch may have to be reduced further. Second, preferential treatment
of the Indians is not unfair when considered under concepts of present
value. Had the Indians been allowed to exercise their legitimate legal
rights for the years preceding Washington, they would have earned
additional substantial income. This income could have accrued interest
and would have a greater value today than its face value at the time
the money was earned. Because they were deprived of this income,
the Indians are arguably now entitled to a greater share of the fish to
redress the imbalance.'35 Third, simply because the non-Indian fisher-
man caught the majority of the fish in the past does not enshrine that
apportionment. Before the treaties, the Indians caught 100%/o of the
fish in the disputed waters, and for a period of time thereafter the
Indians continued to catch the majority of fish. 36 Yet these facts alone
would not entitle the Indians to take that same amount of fish today.
Similarly, the fact that non-Indian fishermen once took far more fish
does not justify maintenance of that percentage of the catch. Allocation
of the resource must be made by reference to the treaty, interpreted
by the accepted canons of construction, rather than historic statistics.
However great the reduction in non-Indian fishing may be required
under the new proposal, it could not be an absolute ban on non-
Indian fishing. Since non-Indians must be allowed access to fish in
common areas, some accommodation must be made. One way which
might accommodate the competing interests is to bar all non-Indian
commercial fishing, limiting non-Indians to sport fishing only. 37
134. Washington, 443 U.S. at 706 (Powell, J., dissenting).
135. This argument has been made to justify preferential treatment of Indians in
water rights disputes. Michael R. Moore, Native American Water Rights: Efficiency &
Fairness, 29 NAT. Rnsoucas J. 763, 775 (1989).
136. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 334.
137. The reaction to such a decision could only be imagined in light of the howl of
protest that the 50-50 split created. Nonetheless, the courts must be willing to interpret
and enforce Indian treaties, regardless of how unpopular their decisions might be to
others.
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V. Conclusion
This new standard is not a formula, and does not produce an exact
apportionment between Indians and non-Indians. The details of any
particular settlement would necessarily be so fact-driven as to preclude
prediction of how exactly the resource will be divided. Such details
are properly left to the trial court. But if the standard is faithfully
applied, it should provide a more just and reasonable settlement of
the problems, fulfilling this nation's sacred word given to the Indian
nations.
This comment has shown the basic incompatibility between the two
standards that are now presently in use in determining the allocation
of resources under treaties. It is hoped that the greater fairness and
wider applicability of the principles that support the PIA standard
suggest that standard is a better path to pursue. The continued appli-
cation of the Washington standard can only lead to continued injustice
to the Indians by incorrectly allocating their fair share of resources
under treaties.
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